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Abstract 
The urban road network provides spatial access to the city through an overlapping 
hierarchy, ranging from highways to local access streets. This pattern of network 
organisation has led to an increased propensity to vulnerability, exposing parts of the 
city to sharp decreases in accessibility when traffic blockages occur on the main links 
or at junctions. Our aim is to define road network vulnerability and to measure the 
road network's exposure to risk. We postulate that the network morphology, structure 
and level of congestion can be influencing factors. Two vulnerability indices which 
pinpoint accessibility loss in the city by removing links and vertices one by one, have 
been developed to assess the network's vulnerability. 
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Introduction 
 
Vulnerability, exposure to risk or reliability are already well researched concepts in 
the field of transport (Bell and Lida 1997, Miller and Shaw, 2001). They have been 
studied not only from a safety point of view, but also as a problem of an insufficient 
level of service and its spatial implications (Berdica 1998, 2001, Lida 1999, Chen et 
al., 1999, Taylor 1999). In recent decades, the urban road network has come to 
provide complete spatial access to the city through an overlapping hierarchy, ranging 
from highways to local access streets. This pattern of network organisation is 
responsible for an increased propensity to vulnerability, exposing parts of the city to 
sharp decreases in accessibility when traffic blockages occur on the main links or at 
junctions. Therefore, there is a growing need for a new characterisation of the 
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network propensity to malfunction, as far as its spatial and functional structures are 
concerned (Berdica 2002). The first part of our paper focuses, as previous research 
has done (Beom and Chang 2002, Gleyze 2001, 2003), on defining road network 
vulnerability and measuring of the road network's exposure to risk. In our approach, 
we postulate that the network morphology, structure and level of congestion can be 
influencing factors. The second part of the paper is concerned with the construction 
of two vulnerability indices and testing of one of them, which pinpoint accessibility 
loss in the city by removing links and vertices one by one and which have been 
developed to assess the network's vulnerability. 
 
1. Vulnerability of the urban traffic system: definition and 
indices 
 
Vulnerability has already been defined by some researchers from a broader 
perspective, including safety. Focusing on network structure vulnerability from a 
circulatory point of view, we shall use and build on the definition proposed by Berdica 
(2000, 2001, 2002) and Goodwin (1992). This is that "there is a need for an overall 
characterisation of road networks, to gain insight into their propensity to malfunction". 
Our goal is not to quantify the consequences of risks on a given area, but to evaluate 
the supply side – the routes between nodes on a network and the nodes themselves 
– more consistently with our theoretical approach to vulnerability. In this case, we 
have found it more appropriate to describe the performance of the road system 
(network + level of service) in terms of serviceability (Berdica 2002). Performance is 
thus defined more accurately by several criteria and not just the ability to go from A to 
B. Serviceability is thus "the basic ability of a system to deliver you from where you 
are, to where you want to be, at the time you want to travel (!) that makes the 
journey worthwhile" (Goodwin, 1992). We shall bear in mind that "vulnerability in the 
road transportation system is a susceptibility to incidents that can result in 
considerable reductions in road network serviceability". The incidents may then be 
more or less predictable, caused voluntarily or involuntarily, by man or nature. Risks 
such as maintenance closure and roadworks are not considered, because drivers 
may know of those incidents in advance and postpone or reroute their journeys 
accordingly. Blockages and congestion should be of a non-recurrent type, due to 
random, unplanned restrictions to traffic flow. 
Vulnerability is a much more relevant concept than reliability (Taylor, 1999) because 
it is solely "related to the consequences of link failure, irrespective of the probability 
of failure" (Berdica 2002). 
Vulnerability is determined by the absolute severity of an incident and by the relative 
consequences of its occurrence on a given infrastructure or service (serviceability in 
the broad sense). For incidents of equal severity, we can define two potential failure 
locations on the graph: 
- the vertices 
- the arcs 
and three network structural predispositions that can cause the level of  serviceability 
to fluctuate: 
- network morphology predispositions 
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- network quality predispositions 
- network crowding predispositions. 
 
1.1 Road network link vulnerability index 
 
This index measures the loss of overall accessibility recorded by the vertices of a 
graph representing the modelled area. The arcs are removed one by one to simulate 
accidental cuts to the links that they represent. Accessibility is considered here to be 
the sum of the available shortest path between all vertices. 
The first stage of the process consists in calculating the sum of the shortest path on 
the complete network to obtain the reference value. (Figure 1, Stage 1) In Stage 2, 
the algorithm automatically removes the first arc in the matrix. The sum of the 
shortest path on the network is thus recalculated for the incomplete network (Figure 
1, Stage 2). The resulting sum is at least equal to or greater than the reference value. 
We then substract the reference value from this new value to obtain the vulnerability 
index associated with the removal of that particular arc. The higher the difference 
between the reference value and the value obtained on the uncomplete graph, the 
greater the loss of overall accessibility caused by the removal of that arc. The greater 
the loss of accessibility, the more strategic the link in the network organisation. We 
then proceed in the same manner for the remaining arcs in the graph, comparing the 
difference between the reference value of the shortest path and the sum resulting 
from the removal of each arc (Figure 1, Stages 3 and beyond). 
 
FIGURE 1 – LINK VULNERABILITY 
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1.2 Road network vertex vulnerability index 
 
This index is based on the same principle as the index measuring arc vulnerability. 
The purpose of this index is to evaluate the loss of overall accessibility resulting from 
the removal of each vertex and to hierarchise the vertices according to their strategic 
importance in the network. Accessibility is calculated in the same way as for the link 
vulnerability index, based on the shortest paths available on the network. There are 
some differences, however. Firstly, the removal of a vertex only requires calculating 
the shortest paths between the other vertices in the graph, even for the reference 
value calculation. The comparison of accessibility values between complete and 
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incomplete networks should be done using the same number of vertices. Thus, there 
is more than one reference value in this index; it changes with each vertex removal 
(Figure 2, Stages 1 and 3). Furthermore, the removal of a vertex results in the 
disappearance of all the adjoining arcs (Figure 2, Stage 2), substantially increasing 
the average loss of accessibility. Technically, the algorithm chooses the first vertex in 
the matrix (v1) and calculates the level of accessibility between all the vertices 
(reference value) through which the shortest paths pass (v1) (Figure 2, Stage 1). The 
same calculation is made after the removal of (v1) (Figure 2, Stage 2). The resulting 
sum is equal to or greater than the reference value. The vulnerability index 
associated with the removal of the vertex (v1) is obtained by subtracting the reference 
value from it. The higher the score, the longer the diversions on the network due to 
the paralysis of (v1) and the higher its strategic role in the network organisation. The 
strategic importance of the vertices depends on their location, whether central or 
peripheral, and on the number and types of arcs (morphology, structure and quality) 
connected to them. We then proceed in the same manner for the remaining vertices 
in the graph, comparing the difference between the reference value of the shortest 
path available and the sum resulting from the removal of each vertex (Figure 2, 
Stages 3 and beyond). 
This second index is particularly relevant for measuring what the literature calls 
"scale-free networks" (Barabasi 2002, Lagues and Lesne, 2003). These new types of 
networks tend to be more resilient to accidental blockages of several vertices, but 
conversely are highly vulnerable if incidents occur on specific strategic vertices 
usually called "super vertices" because of their high level of connectivity. Hub-and-
spoke structures are built according to this network logic, in which hubs become 
highly vulnerable. 
 
FIGURE 2 – JUNCTION VULNERABILITY 
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The following simulations are based on link vulnerability. Further work is required to 
model vertex vulnerability. Research on this issue is under way at Montpellier 
University. 
 
 
2. Morphological vulnerability 
 
Whether relating to arc or vertex vulnerability, a given network may be predisposed 
to be unable to cope satisfactorily with incidents. The diagram (figure 3) summarises 
the various accessibility components or network features. Network accessibility, i.e., 
the ability to go from A to B in a given time, results from a combination of structural, 
qualitative and crowding components. 
These components can be analysed separately and vulnerability calculations can 
take only one of the three parameters into account. In the graph valuation process, 
we characterise each arc in terms of a length value, a qualitative attribute relating to 
the road class and its level of use or crowding. In this simulation, we only evaluate 
accessibility with the road length valuation, which measures only the propensity of 
the network morphology to vulnerability. The road network's morphology is defined by 
the following criteria: 
- number of vertices 
- road length for each pair of vertices. 
Consequently, we are able to measure the impact of the morphological pattern of the 
network on the level of vulnerability (all risks being equal). 
 
Before testing the vulnerability indices on the Montpellier urban area road network, a 
brief summary of the mapping process is necessary to understand how the network 
is modelled and the results represented. 
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FIGURE 3 – COMPONENTS OF ACCESSIBILITY 
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2.1. Mapping vulnerability indices 
 
2.1.1. Graph construction methodology 
  
The graph construction is an important stage in the modelling process because of its 
potential influence on the results.  
 
There are three main concerns:  
- Sticking to the strategic road hierarchy to reflect the local road classification 
strategy, covering the entire built-up area and distinguishing as accurately as 
possible between the various types of roads in order to obtain results that are not 
biased by poor road classification. The resulting graph consists of 302 vertices and 
901 arcs (Figure 4). 
 
- In the selection process, the choice of one vertex over another is extremely 
important. The selection criteria are that the vertices must model all main crossroads 
(major road intersections) and the junctions where roads change from one type to 
another. To reduce possible bias, demographic and socio-economic criteria were not 
used. 
 
- Junction modelling must consider restrictions at some crossroads or interchanges 
where movement is not allowed in all directions (e.g., restricted access interchanges, 
no right/left turn, etc.). 
 
The Montpellier road network model covers the built-up area of the conurbation. The 
selected area is more homogeneous than, say, the metropolitan region, since 
population and network density are high almost everywhere. Therefore, results 
should not be biased by heterogeneity. 
The arcs show direction because of our meso-scale approach, which means that 
one-way streets must be included in traffic movement models. 
 
FIGURE 4 - GRAPH OF MONTPELLIER ROAD NETWORK  
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Let us take a two-way road with one crossroad at each end (C1 and C2), such as 
that represented by (l1, l2). To map the arcs, the two traffic directions are separated 
on either side of Circles 1 and 2 (Figure 5). 
 
FIGURE 5 – MAPPING SCORES 
 
 
On this two-way link, the northbound arc runs from the right of Circle 2 to the right of 
Circle 1. The parallel southbound arc runs from the left of Circle 1 to the left of Circle 
2. 
Only one arc is shown for one-way traffic. The direction of traffic is shown by the 
position of the arc on the left (northbound) or right (southbound) of the circles. 
The description of the network is based on a detailed and comprehensive road 
classification consisting of nine types of roads, rangingfrom "local road" to 
"motorway" (Figure 6). Each road type is characterised by a specific average speed, 
a free-flow speed (speed attainable in free-flow conditions within legal limits) and a 
capacity (number and width of lanes, traffic-light density). 
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FIGURE 6 – ROAD CLASSIFICATION 
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2.1.2. Mapping link vulnerability scores 
 
The results are based only on the arc removal simulations. Further research is under 
way to model the vertex removal results. The results of each simulation are displayed 
in three maps: the first to show the impact of the network morphology; the second to 
show the network quality; and the third to show the impact of the network's functional 
performance at evening peak hour (5-6 p.m.) with computed speed/flow functions for 
each type of road. 
Mapping the vulnerability indices for each link (Figure 5). The thickness of a link is a 
function of the vulnerability index calculated. A thick line means that the removal of 
the arc causes a relatively large loss of accessibility, making the whole network more 
vulnerable (l7, l8). A thin line means that removal of the does not cause much relative 
loss of accessibility and exposure to risk is limited (l1, l6). 
 
2.2. Assessment of Montpellier road network vulnerability 
 
2.2.1. The Montpellier urban area and road network (Figure 4) : 
Montpellier is the centre of a conurbation with a population of 300,000, located in 
southern France, between Marseilles and Barcelona. The built-up area has a Roman 
structure, with a dense city core and sprawling, low-density suburbs. The road 
network is typical of a French urban area:  
- historical roads at the very centre and approaching it, mainly “boulevards” and 
streets of low to average capacity and geometry. 
- some wider roads, built in the latter part of the 20th century to speed up connexions 
between the central area and the expanding outskirts. Some of these are urban 
expressways built in a piecemeal approach without any obvious spatial consistency 
(i.e., Avenue Mendès France, Route de Lodève). 
- the city is also bordered by the A9 motorway, a national and international lifeline 
running along the Mediterranean coast. As the motorway is toll-free in the vicinity of 
Montpellier, with closely spaced junctions, it is used as a southern west-east bypass.  
 
2.2.2. Arc removal simulation 
 
Vulnerability predispositions resulting from network's spatial morphology patterns 
(Figure 7) : 
 
Our aim is to analyse the performance of one arc compared to that of the other arcs 
in the scenario, in relative terms. For this purpose, we apply an index from 0% to 
100%, divided in 10 classes. 
The special yellow class represents network isthmus. These arcs are extremely 
important because their removal results in a loss of connection. They are one-way 
streets in succession or boulevards. They include the Tunnel de la Comédie, built in 
the mid-1980s to allow the pedestrianisation of the main city square. It completes the 
boulevards boxing in the Ecusson, the historical core of the conurbation. 
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FIGURE 7 – NETWORK MORPHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITY 
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The most striking feature is the “natural” predispositions of the city centre. One 
observes that there are only a few alternatives to the N113,  which explains its 
strategic role, whereas in the centre there are plenty of alternative routes, but these 
have the highest scores (note, however, the absence of nodes in the very city 
centre). 
The pattern of the routes is clearly radial, converging towards the centre and 
encircling it with the boulevards. Some cross-routes are obvious, such as those using 
the inner ring road. The radial network pattern is clearly visible with a convergent 
series of radials to andfrom the city centre and an inner ring road connecting them. 
This translates into a mainly central and radial vulnerability. 
 
 
3. Network quality vulnerability 
 
Whether relating to arc or vertex vulnerability, a given network may be predisposed 
to be unable to cope satisfactorily with incidents as we have seen in Section 2. Those 
components can be analysed separately and vulnerability calculations can take only 
one parameter into account. In the graph valuation process, we  characterise each 
arc in terms of a length value, a qualitative attribute relating to the road class and its 
level of use or crowding. In this second case, we evaluate accessibility by adding the 
free-flow speed valuation, which is the maximum attainable speed given legal limits 
and road characteristics. We thus measure the propensity of the network quality to 
vulnerability and the impact of a typical circum-radial hierarchised network structure. 
We define the network's quality by: 
- the number of vertices, and 
- the free-flow speed on links between pairs of vertices (Figure 6). 
Consequently, we are able to measure the impact of the road classification (road 
hierarchy) on the level of vulnerability (all risks being equal).  
 
The introduction of new roads at the top of the hierarchy has resulted in an increased 
concentration of vulnerability on a few links  (Figure 8): 
 
The vulnerability pattern has changed from a radial to a circum-radial structure. Ring 
roads are now well established (the inner ring road, the D700 and Route de Lodève, 
but not the A9 motorway because of its remoteness). 
Vulnerability is dual. On the one hand, network is potentially exposed to severe 
paralysis, but on the other hand, this reflects past transport policies that sought to 
segregate and hierarchise traffic flow on suitable roads and prevent routes from 
concentrating in the centre of town.   
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FIGURE 8 – NETWORK QUALITATIVE VULNERABILITY 
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4. Network functional vulnerability 
 
Whether relating to arc or vertex vulnerability, a given network may be predisposed 
to be unable to cope satisfactorily with incidents as we have seen in Section 2. These 
components can be analysed separately and vulnerability calculations can take only 
one parameter into account. In the graph valuation process, we characterise each 
arc with a length value, a qualitative attribute relating to the road class and its level of 
use or crowding. In this third case, we evaluate accessibility by adding the rush-hour 
speed valuation, which is the maximum attainable speed given legal limits, road 
characteristics and the level of crowding on the network. We thus measure the 
propensity of network crowding to vulnerability. We define the network's level of 
crowding by the following inputs: 
- the number of vertices, and 
- the rush-hour flow speed on links connecting pairs of vertices. 
A method for integrating real-time rush-hour travel speed into accessibility 
calculations has been developed (Appert and Chapelon, 2002) (Figure 9). 
 
FIGURE 9 – TRAVEL TiME CALCULATIONS 
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This simulation requires congestion modelling in order to obtain specific travel 
speeds for each link of the network for the given time period. We have chosen 
evening rush-hour speeds (5-6 p.m.) to model maximum crowding conditions on the 
network. There are several ways to model congestion, depending on whether we 
consider it as coming from the links or the junctions (e.g., traffic-light capacity). For 
this meso-scale approach, microscopic congestion modelling was inappropriate, too 
time-consuming and produces results that are not significantly more accurate than 
more traditional link modelling (HCM, Cohen). Figure 9 summarises the steps of the 
modelling process. For each link (arc in the graph), we have computed: 
- a maximum speed (max. speed) 
- a given capacity (functions of the road characteristics –capacity and max. 
speed) 
- and the assigned hourly flows between 5 and6 p.m. (modelled by 
emme/2). 
For each type of road (road class), a speed-flow function applies, enabling us to 
calculate the effective travel speed on the links. 
One might postulate that in a congestion simulation, modelled hourly traffic flow 
(given by emme/2 traffic model) should be reassigned for each removal or iteration. 
While some reroutings can occur under certain conditions, in our case, traffic 
blockages are of an accidental nature and therefore cannot be anticipated.  
Consequently, we are able to measure the impact of the road classification (road 
hierarchy) on the level of vulnerability (all risks being equal) and use, in other words, 
how the importance of highways and new high-speed roads can influence exposure 
to risk. 
 
How congestion tends to destabilise the whole system by reducing concentration on 
the main links (Figure 10) : 
 
Note that the maximum value is almost twice as high in absolute terms as in the 
previous scenario. This can be explained by greater differences in travel speeds 
because congestion does not affect links in the same way. As for the calculation 
process, the difference in relation to the reference value is greater because of 
degraded traffic conditions on the alternative routes. 
The hierarchy appears to be undermined by congestion. Vulnerability is more 
widespread, main roads don’t know longer seem able to cope and routes are being 
diverted to less suitable roads. This can result in greater “rat-running” on the 
secondary network, which is not suitable for today’s high flows of traffic. 
The A9 motorway, far from being saturated, is playing a bigger part in conducting 
east-west cross routes.  
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FIGURE 10 – NETWORK FUNCTIONAL VULNERABILITY 
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Conclusion  
 
Road networks play a specific role in the urban system. As a circulatory component, 
they provide spatial access to every single part of the city. Road users benefit from 
an almost continuous service thanks to an overlapping road network. This convenient 
network organisation is partly responsible for increasing exposure of interconnected 
roads to gridlock. When the urban road network was more homogeneous and less 
polarised, this exposure was less acute because travel routes were more spatially 
diffused. However, the addition of highways at the top of the road hierarchy has 
resulted in increased polarisation and concentration of traffic on some links and at 
key junctions.  
With increasing traffic flows and innovations in the road construction industry, many 
cities and towns have chosen to build wider, faster roads that are either radial or 
orbital. This kind of infrastructure now overlaps the existing hierarchy, segregating 
through and local traffic, and finally forming the urban trunk road network. Should an 
incident occur on the main carriageways, the whole system collapses, with increased 
rat-running in less suitable areas causing concerns about safety, pollution and the 
quality of life. Consequently, the entire urban road network seems vulnerable by 
exposing parts of the city to decreases in accessibility. 
Network vulnerability is materialised on the two distinctive factors in a network, i.e., 
the vertices and the arcs. The degree of vulnerability also depends on three network 
factors: morphology, structure and performance. 
We have determined that a network is vulnerable to varying degrees according to the 
level of hierachisation of its links and junctions, which leads to a concentration of 
routes. Surprisingly, the latest road additions have tended to increase polarisation 
and therefore vulnerability. The pattern of vulnerability has changed as a result, with 
the city centre tending to be relieved, whereas the outskirts bear the brunt of 
exposure. At rush hour, the deterioration of travel speeds on the major links results in 
less route polarisation, leading to widespread vulnerability. As traffic cannot simply 
disappear after the occurrence of an incident, rat-running increases sharply, resulting 
in high volumes of traffic on unsuitable roads. 
The road network vulnerability indices that we have developed can be used by 
planners and road agencies to evaluate exposure to risk and to address the source 
of this exposure, whether it comes from the network's morphology, quality or level of 
use. The indices also highlight the growing importance of geographical research on 
the risks to which cities are exposed. In our networked, just-in-time urban lives, road 
travel-time reliability is extremely important and the authorities must recognise the 
need to manage networks to reduce exposure to gridlock resulting from incidents as 
much as possible. These simulations can help develop better signalling systems or 
improve network organisation. 
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